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MAKING PEOPLE MATTER: 
DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
IN BRAZILIAN AMAZONIA 
Introduction 
The occupation and national integration of Amazonia, home to the world's 
largest remaining area of tropical rainforest, has been a major policy 
objective of successive Brazilian governments for at least three decades. Yet 
although development strategies for this frontier region have included and 
actively encouraged the in-migration of literally hundreds of thousands of 
settlers, the socio-economic interests of this population have not been 
prioritised by the State. Other overarching macro-economic, political and 
strategic objectives of official policy have taken precedence. This paper 
argues, firstly, that the systematic neglect of people's1 interests has been 
reflected in the adverse socio-economic consequences of a range of ill-
considered official projects and programmes; examples briefly considered 
here include the livestock programme, the Trans-Amazon highway and the 
Polonoroeste colonisation scheme. Secondly, it will be suggested that the 
marginalisation of social issues is being further exacerbated by a strong 
physical bias in current debates over Amazonian deforestation and the need 
to promote environmental sustainability. Thirdly, adoption of a more 
balanced notion of 'sustainable livelihoods' as a guide to policy-making for 
the region would, it is suggested, help to place people's interests higher on 
the political and policy agenda than has so far been the case and thus facilitate 
the greater participation of sociologists and related experts in this process. 
Finally, the more systematic use of sociological knowledge to inform 
decision-making in the planning process could contribute significantly 
towards more socially sensitive, sustainable and cost-effective development 
in Brazil's Amazon region. 
Developing the Amazon: social impacts 
(a) Cattle ranching 
Until the 1960s, the Amazon region of Brazil remained largely untouched by 
official development interventions. The ill-fated rubber industry, established 
in the nineteenth century, was briefly encouraged during the 1940s by 
President Vargas but with little success. The Superintendency for the 
Valorisation of Amazonia (SPVEA), set up in 1953 to promote agriculture, 
industry and infrastructure, also achieved relatively little. In 1960 the region, 
which occupies over half of Brazil, was home to a mere 3.6% of the total 
population, compared with 8% today. Following the 1964 coup, the first 
military government commenced a more aggressive and systematic policy of 
Amazonian occupation. The Superintendency for the Development of 
Amazonia (SUDAM) was established in 1966 and an ambitious highway-
construction programme was started to encourage settlement, both by small 
farmers as well as by wealthier individual and corporate interests. A tax 
incentive scheme (Finor) as well as other very generous financial 
inducements were offered to encourage businessmen from southern Brazil 
and overseas to invest in cattle-ranching and other enterprises as the major 
vehicles for promoting regional development. By 1981, for example, 630 
livestock projects covering 8.4 million hectares had received the equivalent 
of over US$700 million in official subsidies, with some of these estates 
reaching several hundred thousand hectares in size (Mahar 1988). 
Despite the huge amounts invested however, cattle-ranching has failed to 
promote regional growth, to generate employment or raise the incomes of the 
rural masses. An official evaluation revealed that only 92 projects (14%) 
were ever completed and livestock production averaged under 16% of 
anticipated levels (Gasques and Yokomizo 1985). Amazonia remains a net 
beef importer, the infamous 'hamburger connection' being supplied not by 
Brazil - a popular misconception - but by Central America. Most livestock 
projects were set up not for productive purposes at all, but as a front for 
obtaining cheap finance to fund real estate speculation and other activities 
totally unconnected with Amazonian development. Furthermore, the land-
grabbing activities of cattle-ranchers together with growing resistance by in-
coming peasant farmers, has fuelled an intensive process of violent struggle 
over access to land in the region which has resulted in an escalating death toll 
and much human suffering as whole communities have been affected 
(Branford and Glock 1985). In 1986, for example, two-thirds (some 200) of 
all fatalities due to land conflicts in Brazil took place in Amazonia (MIRAD 
1987). In addition to promoting land concentration, landlessness and rural 
violence in the Amazon region, ranching has also been the major factor 
responsible for the current 12% level of Amazonian deforestation and 
associated environmental decay involving the spread of degraded pasture, soil 
compacting and erosion, thus rendering large areas of little use for farming. 
(b) The Trans-Amazon highway 
The strong latifundio-bias of official policy-making for Amazonia during the 
1960s based largely on cattle ranching was tempered in 1970 by the 
government's decision to build the 5,400-kilometre Trans-Amazon highway. 
While serving to promote the geographical integration of Amazonia and 
acting as a symbol of national unity, it had the additional purpose of 
attracting small farmers from the drought-stricken North-East to a series of 
planned settlement schemes along its length. INCRA, the colonisation agency 
created in 1971, hoped to resettle 100,000 landless peasant families in new 
model communities, thus uniting 'men without land to land without men', in 
the words of the then President Medici. It was anticipated that rural 
communities would prosper through the production and sale of both staple 
and commercial crops. At the same time, 'social tensions' in the North-East 
would be ameliorated as the so-called 'excess' population was syphoned off 
to the frontier zone. Total investment in the Transamazdnica has been 
estimated at a huge US$2.3 billion (Smith 1982). 
Unlike cattle-ranching, settlement along the Trans-Amazon highway did 
have an ostensibly 'social' objective, that of benefiting a significant number 
of poor farmers. However, by 1978 only 6% of the original target had been 
met, less than half of which was from the North-East. Many more small 
cultivators were attracted to the region as a result of the easy access provided 
by highways, although the majority could do no more than eke out a fairly 
precarious existence on the fragile Amazonian soils. On the Trans-Amazon 
itself, agricultural performance was poor, undermined by a lack of agro-
economic feasibility studies, the absence of agro-ecological zoning to 
determine appropriate land uses, as well as INCRA's inability to supply 
farmers with the necessary farming inputs such as credit, seeds, fertilizers 
and marketing channels, etc. (Moran 1990). Furthermore, the government's 
failure to provide adequate social infrastructure to meet people's health, 
educational and other daily needs, fuelled the high rate of project 
abandonment. 
In addition to these shortcomings, the Transamazdnica programme was 
subjected to a vitriolic campaign by the powerful Brazilian agribusiness lobby 
which attempted to discredit small farmers as legitimate vehicles for 
developing the region, thus 'blaming the victims' (Wood and Schmink 1978). 
By 1974, a combination of technical problems and political pressure had led 
to an overt policy reversal, in which regional development would once again 
be pursued explicitly through ranching, mining and other large-scale 
activities. The Trans-Amazon scheme was gradually wound down and many 
plots along the highway once destined for small farmers were sold off to 
large landowning interests. Conditions for small farmers along the highway 
steadily deteriorated and have now become so bad that a 'Movement for 
Survival Along the Transamazdnica' has been set up by small farmers along 
the most densely populated stretch to campaign for greater government 
support. 
(c) Polonoroeste 
The North-West Frontier Development Programme (Polonoroeste) was 
officially launched by the government in 1981 to attract small farmers 
expelled from southern Brazil by land concentration arising from the spread 
of mechanised wheat and soybean cultivation. It should be noted, however, 
that the government had been encouraging migration to North-Western 
Amazonia since the early 1970s. Attracted to the region by promises of land 
and government support, by 1988 some 330,000 migrants had settled in 
Rondonia and North-Western Mato Grosso. The World Bank provided loans 
totalling US$435 million (of a total cost of US$1.6 billion), US$92 million 
of which was eventually cancelled. The aim was to fund the paving of the 
region's major highway linking it to the rest of the country, the BR-364, as 
well as to develop agroforestry, health-care and the protection of Amerindian 
lands. Following the winding down of colonisation along the Trans-Amazon 
highway in the mid-1970s, the government increasingly pinned its hopes on 
Polonoroeste as a resettlement solution. 
Once again, however, although seemingly designed as a programme for 
benefiting Brazil's landless rural poor, Polonoroeste has fallen far short of 
its ambitious objectives (Searle 1987; Mahar 1988; Martine 1990). The bulk 
of funding under the programme - some 53%, in fact - was earmarked for 
major highway and feeder road construction, the only component completed 
on schedule. Other elements such as agricultural support and community 
services, as well as Amerindian and environmental protection, were severely 
delayed (Redwood 1993). INCRA was totally unable to keep up with the 
speed and scale of migration to Rondonia and was overwhelmed by the sheer 
volume of applicants. During the initial phase of directed colonisation to the 
North-West region, from 1970 to 1975, about 26,000 families were settled 
onto settlement projects, while a further 23,000 families of rural migrants 
outside of these official schemes were assisted through the legal recognition 
of their unofficially settled plots. In terms of physical domination, however, 
the occupation process in Rondonia has in fact been led by cattle ranchers and 
land speculators rather than by smallholders, thus reproducing Brazil's highly 
polarised landownership on the frontier. By 1980, before Polonoroeste had 
commenced, almost 40% of farmland in Rondonia was already occupied by 
a mere 1% of owners, many benefiting from SUDAM subsidies. Violent 
clashes between ranchers, small farmers and Amerindian groups multiplied 
rapidly during the 1970s. This pattern also spread to the neighbouring state 
of Acre as the BR-364 highway was extended (Bakx 1990). 
Economic progress on the colonisation projects has been compromised by 
inadequate technical support from INCRA and other government agencies and 
by the total failure to develop low-input farm models appropriate to the 
region's varied and delicate ecology. Insufficient investment credit at a time 
of economic adjustment in Brazil, coupled with falling product prices and 
transportation difficulties, obliged many small farmers to abandon 
agroforestry and resume annual crop production or convert land to pasture 
(Redwood 1993). Insecurity of tenure and lack of economic viability have 
contributed to a high rate of farmer turnover, while deforestation in Rondonia 
has increased dramatically from 3 % of the land area in 1980 to 24% by 1988. 
Malaria also spread rapidly in the state, which has one of the highest 
infection rates in the world, as the population exploded and public health 
campaigns funded through Polonoroeste had a limited impact in the propitious 
environment for the spread of the disease that was created by the opening up 
of the region. A major international campaign was waged by NGOs against 
the World Bank and the Brazilian government in protest at the aggravation of 
social conflicts and environmental destruction associated with Polonoroeste. 
Pressure on the Bank from the Foreign Operations Committee of the House 
and Senate Appropriations Committees of the US government culminated in 
the temporary suspension of loan disbursements in 1985 pending 
reformulation of the programme (Gross 1990/91). 
Other examples could be cited of development schemes which have had 
negative social consequences, such as the Grande Carajas Programme (PGC) 
in eastern Amazonia, based on mining and processing activities (Hall 1991). 
Like the cattle ranching programme, the Trans-Amazon highway and 
Polonoroeste, Carajas has also exacerbated rural violence associated with 
land conflicts, land concentration and ecological destruction. Direct social 
impacts have resulted, such as the eviction of indigenous groups and peasant 
farmers from their lands. The Tucurui hydroelectric scheme, for example, 
the largest in any rainforest and designed to supply subsidised power for the 
PGC aluminium industry, displaced up to 35,000 people. Only a prolonged 
protest movement assisted by local NGOs managed to increase the meagre 
compensation originally offered by the power company, Eletronorte, and 
provide for at least partial resettlement of the displaced communities 
(Mougeot 1985). Indirectly also, land concentration, rural violence and 
urban squalor have been severely exacerbated by the increased pressure on 
local resources created by waves of migrants seeking job opportunities. 
While the commercial activities have been heavily subsidised by the 
government to promote exports or favour politically important 
entrepreneurial groups, the interests of the rapidly growing urban and rural 
populations have been seriously neglected. 
In all of the cases mentioned here, the observed socio-economic and 
environmental impacts have been to a large extent conditioned by factors 
beyond the immediate control of development policy-makers; for example, 
Brazil's rampant inflation which encourages land speculation, the political 
and economic power of large landowners, the ineffectiveness of the police 
and judiciary in combating land-grabbing, and economic recession which has 
necessitated public spending cuts. Such consequences have also to some 
extent been seen as the necessary 'price of progress' by successive 
governments whose overriding development strategies in Amazonia have 
been guided by modernisationist principles and 'development pole' strategies, 
with their crude but convenient 'trickle-down' assumptions. Brazil's huge 
foreign debt of over US$120 billion makes the earning of foreign exchange 
a major goal of initiatives such as the Carajas mining and industrial 
programme. The priority of channelling vast subsidies to business groups and 
other political allies was clearly a major driving force behind the inherently 
uneconomic livestock programme for the region. Military interests also had 
a clear geopolitical aim in occupying Brazil's national territory and securing 
its borders against foreign incursions, thus promoting national security and 
'national integration'. This goal has been more explicitly exemplified by the 
recent Calha Norte border programme (Pacheco de Oliveira 1990). Finally, 
Amazonia has long been viewed by policy-makers as performing a 'safety-
valve' function, absorbing so-called 'excess' populations from conflict-ridden 
areas of Brazil such as the North-East and Centre-South, thus diffusing 
'social tensions' and, it is officially hoped, obviating the need for land 
reforms in these regions. 
Such broader contextual constraints will undoubtedly impose severe 
limitations upon the ability of social scientists to influence the development 
process. Notwithstanding this fact, however, it is likely that many of the 
worst effects experienced as a direct result of these programmes, especially 
those aimed specifically at small farmers rather than corporate groups, could 
have been ameliorated. Planning for the development of Amazonia has been 
far too technocratic, with little thought having been given either to (1) the 
prioritisation of people's interests and needs, or (2) the integration of social 
dimensions into the planning and execution of development interventions. 
Experience from Brazil and other parts of the developing world suggests that, 
in Amazonia also, the application of social science skills to help achieve these 
objectives is crucial to efficient, cost-effective and sustainable development. 
Redefining the 'environment9 in Amazonia: 'Greening' versus 
'Sustainable Livelihoods' 
If the needs of Amazonia's people have so far been marginalised in the 
process of State-sponsored development, the current debate and round of 
policy changes relating to environmental issues threatens to obfuscate matters 
further still. Brazil's new Constitution, ratified in 1988 following the end of 
military rule three years earlier, defends the right of citizens to a 'balanced 
environment' and lays responsibility at the door of government agencies to 
'protect and preserve it for future generations' (Brazil 1988, p. 51). Due to 
a combination of domestic pressure from a range of Brazilian NGOs as well 
as growing international concern over the contribution of Amazonian 
deforestation to the 'greenhouse effect', President Sarney launched the 
nationalistic 'Our Nature' (Nossa Natureza) programme in 1989. This 
included the temporary suspension of tax incentives for Amazonian ranching 
and the creation of a new federal agency (IBAMA) to coordinate 
environmental affairs nation-wide. More far-reaching policy innovations 
were introduced under the administration of President Fernando Collor de 
Mello, who took office in March 1990. A new Secretariat for the 
Environment (SEMAM) was created to formulate environmental policy (with 
IBAMA as its executive arm), under the direction of Jose Lutzenberger, a 
world-renowned ecologist and outspoken critic of past government actions in 
this field. IBAMA launched a highly publicised deforestation control 
programme known as 'Operation Amazonia', in which satellite photos 
supplied by the Brazilian Space Institute, airline sightings and other sources 
were used to identify illicit forest-burning. Lightning helicopter raids by 
IBAMA officials were then carried out and, within a few months, some 2,200 
fines had been imposed. 
A jubilant IBAMA claimed that its actions had been responsible for a 
substantial decrease in the rate of deforestation in 1990 compared with the 
previous year. However, it is far more likely that unusually heavy rains as 
well as cuts in tax incentives and subsidised credit due to financial austerity 
measures were the main factors responsible. Furthermore, small farmer 
organisations in the region claimed that 'Operation Amazonia' was socially 
biased, being directed principally at poorer settlers while leaving larger and 
wealthier landowners relatively unaffected. IBAMA also levied substantial 
fines on sawmills and others undertaking illegal logging activities in the 
Carajas region, contributing towards the closure of two of the four 
operational pig-iron smelters there (Hall 1991). 
Going beyond crude command-and-control tactics, SEMAM set up the 
National Environment Programme (PNMA) in 1990, with the aid of US$117 
million in funding from the World Bank. In addition to strengthening 
IBAMA's institutional capacity, the PNMA advocates conservation of natural 
resources, environmental education and the integration of appropriate 
measures within sectoral development plans in agriculture, mining, energy 
and public health, including pilot projects at community level in sustainable 
development (SEMAM 1991). SEMAM and IBAMA have been married 
under the new Ministry of the Environment set up by President Itamar 
Franco. However, despite the attempt to unify environmental policy in 
Brazil, it is unlikely that the new ministry will be able to generate the cross-
sectoral cooperation necessary to make such policies viable. As elsewhere, 
environmental policies, especially with the their current conservationist bias, 
often stand in direct opposition to the development aims of other government 
departments such as the Regional Development Secretariat and the Ministry 
of Mines and Energy. 
Progress on environmental control has been made in several other areas. 
In 1986, environmental impact assessments (RIMAs) by independent bodies 
were decreed compulsory for all major public and private investments. This 
has had implications for planned hydroenergy expansion in Amazonia, and 
has helped to curtail severely the planned programme of 22 pig-iron smelters 
in the Carajas railway corridor, only a small handful of which are currently 
operational (Hall 1991). Following prolonged domestic and international 
campaigning by NGOs, and the murder of rubber tappers' leader Francisco 
'Chico' Mendes in December 1988, four protected 'extractive reserves' have 
been now been established, with several more under consideration by the 
government. In addition, a decree demarcating the 9.4 million hectare 
Yanomami reserve was finally signed by President Collor de Mello in 
November 1991, despite the strong opposition of military and mining 
interests, which have since then been attempting to reverse these earlier 
decisions during the period following the impeachment of President Collor 
and Congressional debates over constitutional revision. 
The most recent major environmental initiative on Amazonia concerns the 
Pilot Programme for the Conservation of the Brazilian Amazon Forest, a 
scheme proposed by the G-7 industrialised countries at their Houston summit 
meeting in July 1990. Since then, representatives from the World Bank, the 
European Commission and the Brazilian government have been negotiating 
submissions by the Brazilian government, while the scheme received further 
backing at the G-7 meeting in London in July 1991 and a financial 
commitment which, in late 1993, stood at US$280 million. Some US$60 
million of this is committed to the Rain Forest Trust Fund, administered 
directly by the World Bank, while the remainder is earmarked for specific 
donor-targeted projects under bilateral arrangements. The Pilot Programme 
comprises four main components and various sub-components, as follows: (i) 
Natural Resources Policy - economic and ecological zoning, environmental 
monitoring, strengthening state-level units and environmental education; (ii) 
Conservation Units and Natural Resources Management - parks and reserves, 
national forests, extractive and indigenous reserves, management of natural 
resources and rehabilitation of degraded areas; (iii) Science and Technology 
- support for scientific research centres and applied research; and (iv) 
Demonstration Projects - funding for small-scale, NGO-sponsored 
initiatives. The G7 plan does contain a number of innovative programmes 
which, if implemented, will help to address directly the needs of Amazonia's 
population, supporting the productive use of the forest while helping to 
conserve natural resources on a more 'sustainable' basis than has hitherto 
been the case under the kinds of policies pursued by successive Brazilian 
governments since the late 1960s. In particular, the strengthening of the 
extractive reserve movement and the development of agroforestry activities 
in national forests, together with support for NGO-supported community 
projects, will be a significant step forward for official aid donors and national 
planners. However, a number of contradictions and potential obstacles 
remain. 
The strong command-and-control and conservationist emphasis of the 
structural component is useful* and necessary but of limited effectiveness on 
its own (FOE 1991). While it may lead to the creation of 'islands of 
conservation', the major stimuli to deforestation will not be tackled; namely, 
land concentration and social pressures in other areas of Brazil which 
encourage migration, SUDAM tax incentives for livestock, logging and 
agricultural schemes (which were partially reinstated in 1991) and other 
generous subsidies to industrial enterprises in the region. The question of 
landlessness and of the urgent need for implementation of the largely 
ineffective 1985 land reform programme (Hall 1990) is also ignored by the 
Pilot Programme. Furthermore, the sweeping nature of agro-ecological 
zoning currently underway may fail to take account of the complex social 
diversity in the region and of the need to provide for a whole range of 
different socio-economic needs in any given area. The pressing requirements 
of Amazonia's urban population, currently half of the region's total, are also 
by-passed, yet this is where some of the worst social and economic problems 
are witnessed. In addition to continuing political opposition from vested 
interests such as the regional landed oligarchies, another major problem, 
which cuts across others to some extent, is the sheer incapacity of the 
Brazilian State machine to implement these new policies effectively. Coherent 
execution is frustrated by high staff turnover in the major ministries and 
development agencies, due to political instability and poor salary levels. 
Bureaucratic delays within the aid organisations involved have also played 
their part in slowing down implementation of the G7 plan. None of the 
planned funding programmes is likely to come on stream before mid-1994 at 
the earliest, three years after the agreement was signed in Houston. 
Although development planning for Amazonia has so far placed a low 
priority on meeting the needs of the majority population of small-scale 
producers, there is scope for redressing this imbalance. A convenient 
entrance point for re-emphasising the centrality of the social dimension is 
provided, somewhat paradoxically, by the current debate on the environment 
in Brazil. While recent discussions and policy innovations have tended to 
emphasise 'green' or physical environmental issues, this is only half of the 
conceptual equation. As early as 1972, the Stockholm Conference on the 
Human Environment, as its name implies, stressed the importance of 
addressing mass poverty as part and parcel of the ecological question (UNEP 
1981). Fifteen years later, the Brundtland Report (WCED 1987) underlined 
the importance of meeting basic human needs and prioritising the interests of 
small producers as a precondition for preserving the physical environment. 
Major development agencies such as the World Bank (1990a), the Inter-
American Development Bank (LACD 1990) and the UNDP (1991) have all 
reaffirmed this notion. In a similar vein, the first of 27 Principles contained 
in the Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development produced at 
UNCED in June 1992 states that, 'Human beings are at the centre of concerns 
for sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive 
life in harmony with nature'. The fifth principle adds, 'All States and all 
people shall cooperate in the essential task of eradicating poverty as an 
indispensable requirement for sustainable development...'. 
Yet it remains to be seen whether Brazil's concern for human development 
is compatible with other declarations made at UNCED. Together with 
countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia, Brazil's rejection of the North's 
global management of forests approach in favour of national control over 
forest resources was significant. This stance in the 'Declaration of Principles 
on Forests' could facilitate the channelling of foreign resources for research 
into sustainable development with a human dimension, as witnessed in 
several components of the G7 Pilot Programme and the Global Environmental 
Facility (GEF). On the other hand, it might provide a carte blanche for 
logging interests to deplete forests as they wish, in the face of relatively 
ineffective controls by IBAMA and state environmental agencies. Another 
interpretation might, however, be that such agreements are rhetorical and 
make no difference whatsoever to either the pace of deforestation or 
development patterns within Amazonia, whose causes are, arguably, largely 
beyond the direct control of the federal government. 
Similarly, the Biodiversity Convention, in whose formulation Brazil played 
a leading role (Viola 1993), recognises national property rights over natural 
resources for development purposes. To the extent that this gives effective 
control over genetic resources to governments with a policy commitment to 
the expansion of stable production systems for small-scale cultivators, this 
can have a positive socio-economic impact. Yet if this means that control 
over forest resources will be increasingly vested in the hands of large 
corporations, national or foreign, with little benefit being fed back to forest 
dwellers from whose lands such resources are extracted, a golden opportunity 
for promoting sustainable development for large sections of the population 
will have been forfeited. 
Mainstream government policy in Brazil does not provide a favourable 
context for the promotion of sustainable livelihoods on a wide scale. Concern 
for the social dimensions of development and environment is conspicuous by 
its absence from official environmental policy statements in Brazil, in spite 
of UNCED. Brazil has been accused of having no coherent national 
environment policy as such, merely an increasingly decentralised series of 
initiatives taken at state and municipal levels (Cleary 1993). What passes for 
official environmental policy for Amazonia seems to place almost exclusive 
emphasis on controlling forest loss via IBAMA-administered controls. In 
reality, however, deforestation driven by commercial timber extraction, 
(continued) subsidised cattle ranching and property speculation, proceeds at 
significant if varying rates, ranging from 20,000 square kilometres a year 
during 1985-89 to 13,000 square kilometres in 1990 and 11,000 the following 
year (The Economist 1991; Jornal do Brasil 1992). Far too little stress is laid 
upon researching economically viable, non-destructive livelihood options for 
the millions of small-scale producers who make their living from the land and 
its forest resources. Potentially sustainable activities in agriculture, 
agroforestry, extractivism and forest management have received precious 
little state support in Brazil, and experiments are being undertaken largely as 
the result of earmarked funding from foreign donors under initiatives such as 
the G7 Pilot Programme, mentioned above. Other successful ventures have 
tended to be purely private, such as the Japanese-descended producers of 
Tome Acu in Para who cultivate a range of 40 products from black pepper to 
passion fruit and oilpalm for sale on national and international markets 
(Barrow 1990). 
The current ecological focus has, furthermore, served in part at least to 
depoliticise the environmental debate and allow decision-makers to avoid 
addressing sensitive social and economic issues, deflecting whatever 
pressures exist to reexamine fundamental matters such as land reform, for 
example. A high-profile debate on physical environmental problems such as 
deforestation, which started after the intense burnings of 1987 and continued 
in the run-up to UNCED, has encouraged a perhaps excessive preoccupation 
with this phenomenon, important though it is, at the expense of more central 
concerns. A large part of the responsibility for this bias must be laid at the 
door of radical Western environmental organisations, whose vociferous 
lobbying in the wake of Chico Mendes's death in 1988 in favour of biomass 
preservation rather than sustainable human development has helped to 
reinforce the emerging conservationist stance of the Brazilian government 
and the reformulation of environmental policy in the final years of President 
Sarney's administration. 
While attention to overall levels and rates of deforestation is necessary in 
terms of how forest-loss depletes Brazil's natural capital and contributes to 
global warming, this is only the most sensationalist part of the equation. Land 
redistribution as well as investment in sustainable production technologies 
and supportive structures for small producers are a far more pressing 
concern. Only when these issues are seriously tackled, irrespective of overall 
deforestation figures, will Amazonia's population of small-scale producers 
be able to sustain their livelihoods in the region without being obliged to 
adopt destructive strategies such as uncontrolled slash-and-burn. At the same 
time, policies which actively encourage deforestation, such as the continued 
granting of tax incentives for pasture formation in certain parts of Amazonia, 
and the cutting down of trees as proof of land occupation for the purposes of 
land titling, will have to be revised. Other macro-economic phenomena such 
as Brazil's rampant inflation, which is arguably more important than fiscal 
incentives as a spur to land speculation, are more difficult to deal with in the 
short term. 
Be that as it may, the current heated debate within Brazil on Amazonian 
deforestation could provide an opportune context for the redefining of 
'environment' to encompass a social as well as a strictly ecological 
dimension. A more people-centred strategy of Amazonian development could 
be fostered by adopting a broader, integrated concept of environmental 
sustainability, which would recognise the importance of simultaneously 
addressing people's development priorities alongside the simple protection 
of natural resources. By providing resource-poor farmers with the means to 
develop 'sustainable rural livelihoods' (Chambers 1988) not only will they be 
given an incentive to cultivate the land in a non-destructive fashion, but they 
will have a strong vested interest in securing forest and farmland against the 
predatory incursions of commercial and speculative forces. Acceptance of the 
need for urgent action on the Amazon environment across a broad political 
spectrum, both within Brazil and internationally, could provide a turning 
point. Not only could the human environment be legitimised as a concept and 
as an area for prompt action to save the rainforest, but the more systematic 
application of sociological knowledge in the search for appropriate solutions 
could also be facilitated. 
Applying sociology to Amazonian development 
Despite the huge expansion of official development projects and programmes 
in Amazonia, which have affected the lives and livelihoods of literally 
millions of people, sociology and related disciplines such as social 
anthropology have not played a major role in the planning process. Many of 
these interventions have had massive direct or indirect social impacts, as the 
examples briefly analysed above made clear. These outcomes are often 
conditioned by contextual macro-economic, political or institutional factors 
which are beyond the power of planners to influence. Yet it is evident that 
project failures are particularly likely to occur where social variables are 
ignored. Much of the huge wastage of resources and the enormous social cost 
characteristic of Brazil's official programme for developing Amazonia could 
undoubtedly have been avoided by the incorporation of sociological 
knowledge into planning procedures. 
Conventionally most project-making, especially where large infrastructural 
schemes are concerned, deals with impacted groups as something of an 
afterthought, and Amazonia is no exception. Little consideration is given to 
prioritising people's basic needs, nor are affected groups invited to 
participate in project selection or design, even though it is they who are often 
the best sources of information about local conditions. Consequently, almost 
no space exists for social analysts and social planners at this point. Generally 
in the development field, where sociologists have participated at all in the 
project cycle, they have tended to be called in at the monitoring and 
evaluation stage to try and 'pick up the pieces' and somehow find the 
'missing factor'. They have not been called in at the more critical appraisal 
and design stages, when the social analyst, 'can help identify, conceptualise 
and deal with the social and cultural variables involved in financially induced 
programs' (Cernea 1991a, p. 12). The ignoring or mishandling of socio-
cultural variables in Amazonia, both by Brazilian institutions as well as by 
multilateral and bilateral aid agencies, has made a prime contribution to the 
notoriously high rate of project failure in the region. Evidence from a study 
of completed World Bank-funded projects, for example, found that economic 
rates of return were twice as high in those which took due account of socio-
cultural variables compared with those which were socially insensitive, 
leading the author to conclude that, 'Sociocultural planning for economic 
development is not simply socially desirable; it is demonstrably cost-
effective' (Kottak 1991, p. 432). 
The incorporation of socio-cultural analysis is important throughout the 
project cycle, from identification, design and appraisal through to 
implementation, monitoring and ex-post evaluation. However, it is 
particularly crucial that social expertise be applied in the earlier phase 
leading up to appraisal, since this input will be the most significant in terms 
of influencing project design. Several major flaws may be identified in 
current procedures for planning Amazonian development, as illustrated by 
Amazonian livestock projects, resettlement schemes and other development 
initiatives: (1) insufficient or inappropriate use of social knowledge in project 
identification; (2) socially and culturally biased project designs which are 
incompatible with the local situation; (3) lack of appropriate socio-economic 
and cultural skills in project execution and monitoring. As already noted, 
social analysts have tended to be called in more at the evaluation stage, when 
it is too late for them to have any influence beyond suggesting token 
compensatory measures to help offset the more dramatic consequences of the 
project or programme in question. In Brazilian Amazonia, an area of great 
human and ecological diversity, where technocratic solutions have been 
readily imposed with no such forethought, there are clearly many ways in 
which social expertise could be applied across a range of projects and 
programmes to make them more environmentally, economically and socially 
sustainable. As examples, three such potential areas will be briefly explored. 
(a) Resettlement schemes 
The Brazilian government and multilateral development banks have invested 
vast sums in Amazonian resettlement programmes such as the Trans-Amazon 
highway and Polonoroeste, directly or indirectly attracting tens of thousands 
of landless farmers and their families into new and fragile Amazonian 
environments. It is no coincidence that both of these relatively unsuccessful 
small-farmer colonisation programmes failed totally to appraise social 
impacts. Sociologists and social anthropologists must be involved at the 
earliest stages of such programmes to ask basic questions about a number of 
critical issues which would not normally be considered by other technical 
specialists, but which are central to the success of the strategy. 
Sociological expertise can play a valuable role in avoiding or mitigating 
these frequently disastrous social impacts by informing resettlement planning 
procedures. These could be substantially improved, for example, by 
considering: 
(i) Issues relating to the socio-cultural fit of proposed settlement models 
and their suitability for meeting settlers' needs. These include: security 
of land tenure in potentially conflictive situations where commercial 
groups may attempt to usurp people's land and common property rights; 
the physical structure and location of new communities; formal 
educational provisions for children to fit in with the agricultural 
calendar; health-care facilities to treat local problems such as malaria. 
(ii) Compatibility of new settlements with the interests and economic 
activities of pre-existing indigenous groups in the area. This might 
include: the extent to which new projects threaten the livelihoods of local 
Amerindian and peasant groups, generating violent conflicts over access 
to land and forest resources; programmes of benefits in order adequately 
to compensate adversely affected local communities. 
(iii) Forms of social and economic organisation and management 
necessary to maintain longer-term sustainable livelihoods, including: 
sociological inputs into the design of appropriate, low-input farming 
systems; advice on formal and informal types of social organisation at 
the community and regional levels necessary to enhance solidarity and 
mobilisation against external aggressors. 
Although less official emphasis is now placed on organised colonisation in 
Amazonia, these issues are not simply of academic interest. The 
government's plan to develop the northern borders region of Brazil (Calha 
Norte, or the northern headwaters of the River Amazon), covering 1.2 
million km2 or 25% of Amazonia, will involve considerable directed 
resettlement. Drafted in 1985 essentially as a military initiative, the Calha 
Norte scheme will entail guided frontier settlement as part and parcel of this 
plan to secure the area against possible foreign incursions (Pacheco de 
Oliveira 1990). In order to avoid the social disasters brought about by 
Polonoroeste and the Trans-Amazon highway, therefore, planners would be 
wise to take on board the lessons of experience and the implications of 
sociological analysis for improved project performance. 
(b) Hydropower projects 
Amazonia is a large potential source of hydroelectric energy and in recent 
years several major projects have been undertaken, with some 30 new 
schemes planned by the year 2010. Together, these may eventually produce 
almost 60% of Brazil's energy supplies, compared with 5% in 1986 
(Cummings 1990). Although the tapping of this renewable energy resource 
offers an environmentally more desirable alternative to the burning of fossil 
fuels, its social consequences for urban-based, peasant and Amerindian 
groups have been dramatic. The Tucurui scheme, cited above, displaced up 
to 35,000 people, double the official estimate, in the main without alternative 
resettlement provisions being made or adequate compensation being included 
at the planning stage. 
The lack of social inputs in project appraisal and design created many 
avoidable problems. Criteria adopted for indemnifying rural displacees, for 
example, ignored the region's atypical land tenure structure, based on 
individual and collective de facto rather than de jure occupation, thus 
rendering the majority of small farmers ineligible for compensation and 
creating much popular resentment towards the authorities (Mougeot 1985). 
Furthermore, the reservoir flooded a 100-kilometre stretch of the Trans-
Amazon highway, partially flooding an INCRA colonisation project and 
necessitating the expropriation of some 800 farming plots. This took place 
despite the fact that Tucurui had been planned before the Transamazdnica. 
Massive social consequences are also foreseen as a result of the planned 
series of hydropower schemes along the Xingu river, which will encroach 
upon the territories of several indigenous groups, flood part of the town of 
Altamira and displace a still unknown number of riverine farmers (Santos and 
Andrade 1988). 
The national power authority (Eletrobras) has started to learn from past 
errors and, in its latest plans, has adopted the notion of 'socio-environmental' 
impact assessments of its hydroelectric projects, particularly in relation to 
Amerindian groups. However, it is critical that technical social expertise be 
more systematically incorporated alongside ecological concerns to deal with 
the broad range of human issues which arise in this context. Social analysis 
could play a valuable role at key stages of hydropower schemes: (i) Social 
impact assessment at the appraisal stage can forecast the project's 
repercussions on the population both in the immediate vicinity and further 
afield. This would allow for the full social costs to be estimated, laying the 
groundwork for a proper compensation and relocation programme to be 
prepared, better suited to the needs of the populations at risk, as occurred in 
the case of the Itaparica dam along the Sao Francisco river in North-East 
Brazil (Hall 1992). (ii) Social experts also have a crucial role to play during 
project implementation and monitoring of progress. This could help to ensure 
that adequate attention is being paid to production systems, to infrastructural 
provision in basic health, education and other facilities as well as to forms of 
community mobilisation and organisation for encouraging the longer-term 
economic and social sustainability of affected groups. 
(c) Farming systems 
A third area where social science has a major contribution to make towards 
more efficient planning for Amazonian development is in the design and 
implementation of farming systems for small producers. In the past, 
pressures arising from land concentration and rural conflict in the South and 
North-East of Brazil have attracted rural migrants to Amazonia's frontier 
zones. The slash-and-burn techniques, while adequate for low-density areas, 
have proved increasingly destructive as the population of Amazonia has 
increased pressure on land beyond its carrying capacity. Independent research 
has shown that it is possible to develop farming systems both for short-cycle 
staple food crops and for commercial agricultural and forest products which 
are suited to the region's highly diverse range of micro-ecosystems, both in 
the wet lowlands and the higher drylands of poorer soils (Barrow 1990; 
Gradwohl and Greenberg 1988; Furley 1990; Eden 1990). Investigations into 
sustainable land-use in the Amazon region have, however, tended to focus on 
forest management, which has been highlighted by the rubber-tappers' well-
publicised struggles for 'extractive reserves', and by the plight of Brazil's 
indigenous tribes and their continuing demands for legally demarcated and 
protected reserves (Davis 1977; Gross 1989; Revkin 1990). 
Given the substantial rural population of Brazil's Amazon region, which 
depends wholly or partly on forests for its livelihood, sociologists have a 
fundamental role to play in the development of an appropriate social forestry 
strategy. Originating in India in the early 1970s, this concept addresses the 
long-term forestry needs of the population which depends upon this natural 
resource by involving farmers and landless peasants in designing and 
implementing schemes which encourage the sustainable use of trees. 
Conservation initiatives such as the global Tropical Forestry Action Plan 
(TFAP), which is coordinated by the FAO, have been heavily criticised for 
their apparent emphasis on large-scale commercial forest exploitation by 
corporate groups and their failure adequately to consider the interests of those 
who live in the forest (Marshall 1991). Social forestry, in contrast, prioritises 
the sustainable extraction of timber to meet the needs of poorer strata, 
emphasising income-generation, basic fuelwood and construction materials 
and afforestation to avoid longer-term resource depletion. As Cernea (1981) 
has demonstrated in the case of Pakistan, failure to take due account of 
critical social variables in such projects, such as informal patterns of land 
tenure, for example, can lead to project failure and only underlines the 
importance of sociological inputs as well as local participation in the 
processes of information-gathering and planning. 
Yet justified as this emphasis is on forest management, two-thirds of 
Amazonia's rural population of some seven million depend not upon forest 
extractivism for their livelihoods but on agricultural activities. Some non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) working in Amazonia have tried to 
address this problem by initiating projects aimed at identifying appropriate 
agro-forestry systems for small producers.2 Yet Brazil's official agricultural 
research institution (Embrapa) has always been geared to commercial, 
export-oriented crops for large-scale farmers. Only now is it beginning to 
recognise, slowly and cautiously, the importance of addressing questions of 
small-scale, sustainable agriculture for Amazonia (Embrapa 1989). A mere 
1 % of Amazonia's rural population lives in planned settlement projects, the 
remainder being spontaneous migrants. An official programme of farming 
systems research is urgently needed, therefore, into the varieties of shifting 
cultivation practised and their relationship with forest extractivism. Clearly, 
sociologists and anthropologists would have a major role to play in such 
enquiry. This is evident, given the established importance of such key social 
variables as household composition, gender relations, community structure, 
land tenure patterns, local power relationships and perceptions of risk, in 
establishing viable agricultural production (Norman 1980). It is also crucial 
from the point of view of identifying mechanisms for encouraging farmer 
participation as a prerequisite for effective, farmer-oriented research which 
will respond to people's needs (Farrington and Martin 1988; Chambers et al. 
1989). Accumulated experience in the fields of farming systems research and 
social forestry have demonstrated the validity of this principle quite clearly. 
It is thus evident that many entrance points exist for sociologists in the 
planning of Amazonian rural development, from the assessment of likely 
social impacts to information-gathering which will assist in the design of 
projects appropriate to the region's biological, physical and human diversity. 
Yet in order to participate fully in a more interdisciplinary planning process, 
sociologists should take part in policy formulation rather than just the 
execution of predetermined actions. To the extent that social analysts can 
demonstrate the importance of sociological knowledge in determining project 
success, even when measured in conventional economic terms, their 
involvement in policy-making is likely to increase. Sociologists and 
anthropologists at the World Bank, for example, have been instrumental in 
bringing about fundamental procedural and policy changes within the 
institution to provide for an integrated, comprehensive resettlement in such 
instances to replace the piecemeal approach adopted so far with its heavy 
social costs (Cernea 1988; World Bank 1990b). Such socially-influenced 
policy priorities will have an impact on project design in Amazonia in view 
of the planned expansion in hydro-energy production in the region to be 
financed by multilateral loans. 
A word of caution is also in order, however. While the integration of social 
analysis into planning for Amazonia is potentially advantageous for human 
development in the region, sociologists and anthropologists have not always 
been so sensitive in applying their knowledge. There is clearly a risk that 
these social scientists, like experts from any other discipline, will merely use 
their skills for coopting people into existing, possibly disadvantageous 
strategies. Colonising powers have long employed ethnologists and 
anthropologists for such manipulative ends, causing disenchantment among 
many social anthropologists and their withdrawal from 'non-academic', 
applied activities (Hall 1987 and 1988; Cernea 1991a). While such reluctance 
to become involved is less pronounced nowadays, it is still present and in 
extreme cases may be regarded, according to Leach, as 'a kind of neo-
colonialism' (quoted by Grillo and Rew 1985, p. 14). 
At the same time, however, social scientists have also been guilty of failing 
to develop applied skills commensurate with the development challenge. 
While economists and natural scientists have been far more successful in this 
endeavour, it is only in recent years that universities have begun to equip 
sociologists, anthropologists and other social planners with the skills 
necessary to unravel development problems, construct suitable policies and 
follow the process through the planning cycle. As sociologists have started 
to make their mark in the world of development, however, institutional 
barriers to their being accepted as an integral part of multidisciplinary teams 
have been gradually reduced. At the same time, social specialists have come 
to realise that they too have much to learn from their engineering and other 
colleagues about the complexities of the development process. 
Yet there is still much resistance within bureaucracies to social inputs, 
which are often seen as irrelevant or leftist or disruptive of 'normal' 
procedures. Social scientists are, after all, far more likely than engineers or 
economists to raise uncomfortable issues relating to social impacts, possibly 
delaying and/or increasing the cost of project implementation. In the case of 
Polonoroeste, for example, a consultant anthropologist publicly accused the 
World Bank of ignoring his recommendations concerning policies for 
indigenous groups affected by the programme (Price 1985). Sociology itself 
was only recently officially recognised as a profession in Brazil and, 
throughout the period of military rule, was synonymous with subversion. For 
all of these reasons, therefore, to do with both institutional and political 
barriers as well as the shortcomings of social science as an applied discipline, 
the inclusion of social analysis in planning for Amazonian development is far 
from being a straightforward proposition. 
Conclusion 
Several areas have been suggested in which sociologists and related experts 
could play a key role in making development planning for Amazonia more 
responsive to people's needs. In some fields this process has already started, 
most notably for example in the use of social experts to appraise the impacts 
of involuntary resettlement, as well as the involvement of anthropologists in 
dealing with Amerindian affairs. However, as this paper has tried to 
demonstrate, the scope for sociologically-informed development planning in 
Amazonia is considerably greater. To date, policies, projects and 
programmes aimed at harnessing the region's resources have all but ignored 
the interests and priorities of the broader population. It is clear that, in 
Brazilian Amazonia, the marginalisation of social dimensions in the planning 
and implementation process has financial, political and technical roots that 
are interrelated. The huge cost implications of guided frontier colonisation 
and of comprehensively resettling large displaced populations, for example, 
have led authoritarian regimes simply to ignore their obligations to adversely 
affected groups. This concern remains, but can be overcome through more 
careful costing at the planning stage and more appropriate international 
funding arrangements. Three decades of political repression in Brazil from 
1964 onwards, and planners' associated reluctance to allow any form of 
popular discontent to be voiced, have made decision-makers reluctant to 
recognise the legitimacy of needs expressed by the people themselves. 
Despite setbacks such as the curtailing of Brazil's agrarian reform 
programme (Hall 1990), however, political liberalisation and the ending of 
military rule have created new entry points for groups threatened by 
development projects to organise in defence of their own interests. Witness, 
for example, the cases of the Itaparica and (to a less extent) Tucurui 
hydropower scheme, the rubber-tappers of Amazonia and the Kayapo indians' 
protests against the Xingu valley hydroelectric complex.3 
There is an urgent need for social analysis to be integrated more 
systematically and effectively into the planning process. While it is possible 
to understand the slowness of Brazilian government authorities to face up to 
this challenge, given the political and financial implications of socially-
sensitive planning, such an attitude is less comprehensible on the part of 
bilateral and, in particular, multilateral aid bodies. Improvements have been 
made by major organisations such as the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank in the provision of adequate technical expertise properly 
to address Amazonian development issues. However, these have been focused 
overwhelmingly on physical environmental problems, while broader social 
dimensions, especially at the level of policy-making, continue to be at best 
marginalised and at worst ignored. Given their major role in financing 
infrastructural expansion in Amazonia, therefore, it is incumbent upon both 
multilaterals as well as European and Japanese bilateral aid bodies to play a 
lead role in rectifying this imbalance by comprehensively examining how 
they themselves deal with social aspects of aid-funded development. They can 
marshall the funds, the expertise and the political clout to address such 
matters, setting valuable precedents which could help to modify national 
planning procedures and priorities. 
Non-governmental organisations have played a pioneering role in 
developing closer working contacts with grassroots groups and in providing 
channels for the expression and defence of people's interests. Although not 
faultless by any means, NGOs have been more prepared than official 
organisations to apply social skills and engage in dialogue with populations 
marginalised by official planning procedures. Yet social skills must, 
increasingly, be combined with political shrewdness. Grassroots successes 
in pressuring the authorities for social dimensions to be incorporated into 
development planning and execution (see note 3) have probably been due as 
much to strong political pressure being exerted domestically and 
internationally, often through strong NGO lobbying networks, as to the 
application of sociological skills per se. At the same time, however, it is 
vital that sociological expertise is not simply coopted, with the aim of 
legitimising preconceived and perhaps socially inadequate plans. A much 
greater emphasis on participatory research and development, on listening to 
and working with beneficiary groups rather than merely acting on their 
behalf, will be necessary in order to counteract the still dominant blueprint 
approach. Only then, perhaps, will people begin to matter rather more in the 
development of Amazonia. 
NOTES 
1. The term 'people' is used throughout this paper to refer to Amazonia's 
majority population of small settler and caboclo farmers as well as indigenous 
groups. Urban issues and problems are not specifically addressed as such. 
2. For example, the Centro Agro-Ambiental do Tocantins (CAT), or Agro-
Environmental Centre of the Tocantins, based in the eastern Amazon town of 
Maraba. This is a pioneering experiment involving cooperation between 
Brazilian university social scientists, local rural trades unions and technicians, 
financed by a combination of Brazilian government money, NGOs and official 
overseas assistance. In this project, sociologists and agronomists engage in joint 
applied research and development of agroforestry and agricultural methods in 
order to slow down the pace of forest destruction due to the adoption of slash-
and-burn techniques while providing more sustainable options for the longer 
term. 
3. At Itaparica, in the Sao Francisco valley of Brazil's North-East region, a 
successful campaign was waged by the rural population throughout the 1980s 
for the provision of a unique comprehensive resettlement programme for 40,000 
people displaced by a hydroelectric project (Hall 1992). The rubber tappers of 
Acre state waged a long battle during the 1980s against cattle ranchers and land-
grabbers encroaching upon the rainforest. Following a well-mounted and 
socially-informed domestic campaign, as well as international pressure from 
NGOs (culminating in the murder in December 1988 of their leader Francisco 
'Chico' Mendes), several extractive reserves have been demarcated by the 
Brazilian government. The first four reserves (Alto Jura, Chico Mendes, Rio 
Cajari and Rio Ouro Preto) cover 2.1 million hectares and are home to 22,000 
people. Five additional proposed reserves will involve a similar area and some 
29,000 people (Brazil 1992). Plans to build a series of dams along the Xingu 
river valley in Amazonia have been systematically opposed by local indigenous 
groups, led by the Kayapo, assisted once again by strong international NGO 
pressure on the Brazilian government and the World Bank, which suspended a 
proposed US$500 million power sector loan for Brazil (Goodman and Hall 
1990; Santos and Andrade 1988). 
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